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Abstract
In their seminal contribution Lazear and Rosen (1981) show that wages based
upon rank induce the same e¢ cient e¤ort as incentive-based reward schemes.
They also show that this equivalence result is not robust towards heterogene-
ity in worker ability, as long as ability is private information, as it is not pos-
sible to structure contests to simultaneously satisfy self-selection constraints
and rst best incentives.
This paper demonstrates that e¢ ciency is achievable by a simple modi-
cation of the prize scheme in a mixed (heterogenous) contest. In the L&R
contest, the winners prize as well as the losers prize are xed in advance.
In this paper I demonstrate that e¢ ciency is restored by a modication of
contest design, in which contestants choose from a menu of prizes.
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1 Introduction
Tournaments or contests are contracts that reward each agent according to
her performance relative to others. In their seminal contribution Lazear
and Rosen (1981), hereafter referred to as L&R, show that with risk-neutral
agents wages based upon rank induce the same e¢ cient e¤ort as piece rate
schemes. They also show that this equivalence result is not robust towards
heterogeneity in worker ability, as long as ability is private information, as
it is not possible to structure contests to simultaneously satisfy self-selection
constraints and rst best incentives. Their argument consists of two parts.
First, they show that agents cannot self-sort into di¤erent leagues (where each
league represents an e¢ cient homogenous contest), since all agents prefer to
participate in the "high ability" league. Second, if all types participate in the
same "mixed" contest, they demonstrate that it is not possible to provide all
participants with rst best incentives.
This paper demonstrates that e¢ ciency is achievable by a simple modi-
cation of the prize scheme in a mixed (heterogenous) contest. In the L&R
contest, the winners prize as well as the losers prize are xed in advance. I
refer to this as a standard contest. In this paper I demonstrate that e¢ ciency
is restored if contestants choose from a menu of prizes, which I refer to as a
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generalized contest. As in standard contests, prizes are allocated according to
relative performance, hence ordinal information on performance is su¢ cient.
The problem identied by L&R belongs to a more general problem in
optimal contract design. Designing contracts that are compatible with self-
selection as well as providing e¢ cient e¤ort incentives are often rather com-
plex, and typically linear only under very restrictive assumptions, see e.g.
Gibbons (1997). As demonstrated below, the underlying mechanisms of the
optimal contest scheme described in this paper correspond to well known
mechanisms found in the contract literature.
The ine¢ ciency of standard contests demonstrated by L&R has been
discussed in several contributions in the literature, e.g. OKee¤e et al (1984),
Bhattacharaya and Guasch (1988) and Yun (1997). Unlike this literature,
I analyze the case where the optimal discriminatory prize premium is non-
monotonic in ability, see further discussion below.
2 The original L&R model
The L&R model is specied as follows: Two contestants (j and k) of equal
abilities simultaneously invest j and k under strictly convex and symmetric
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investment cost functions C(): Their respective (lifetime) outputs equal
investment plus a luck component, which is q = + ", where " has constant
variance and zero mean and zero correlation across contestants. Gross prot
equals V q, hence rst best allocation is represented by V = C 0().
The contestant with the largest output wins the contest and is paid the
prize premium r in addition to the base wageW . Due to the luck component,
the contestantsrespective win probability functions are continuous in the
two investment levels. If we let G() denote the CDF of the di¤erence in luck
terms "j   "k, and g() its density, the probability that j wins is G(j   k),
and that k wins, 1 G(j   k). Thus, contestant j0s expected utility is:
W +G(j   k)r   C(j)
with rst order condition
g(j   k)r   C 0(j) = 0
In a symmetric equilibrium j equals k, hence the rst order condition
can be expressed
g(0)r   C 0() = 0 =) [g(0)r]
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which determines a strictly increasing investment function [g(0)r].
Hence the prize premium r multiplied by the density of the noise term g(0)
corresponds to the incentive power of the classic piece rate reward scheme.
The density of the noise term g(0) is crucial; due to the noise term an in-
crease in the level of investment increases the players win probability; with
a stronger e¤ect the more dense the noise distribution is. If the noise distri-
bution is very dense, the pure strategy equilibrium breaks down, as demon-
strated in L&R, see also Nalebu¤ and Stiglitz (1983). Observe that as the
variance in the noise term approaches zero, the contest approaches an all pay
auction, in which equilibrium achieved is in mixed strategies.
Since [g(0)r] is strictly increasing, rst best allocation is achievable by
a proper choice of prize premium. With e¢ cient allocation, wealth is maxi-
mized, and the correspondence to optimal piece rate schemes is established.1
The next section introduces type heterogeneity.
1As shown by L&R the equivalence result does not hold when risk aversion is intro-
duced. Observe that the risk structure of a contest di¤ers in two respects: the down side is
limited since the worst case scenario is to win the losers prize - that is good news for risk
averse agents. The bad news is that there is no possible realization between the winners
and the losers prizes. L&R shows that the ranking of the two schemes is indecisive and
dependent on the specication of the utility function.
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3 A contest with type heterogeneity
Denote by  the single agents ability. I assume that ability is private in-
formation2 and continuously distributed with symmetric probability density
f(). With no loss of generalization I assume the support is [; ].
The investment cost function of an agent with ability  is denoted by
C(; ). I assume that the agents total investment cost C(; ), as well as
her marginal investment cost C 0(; ), are strictly decreasing in .
In rst best, the marginal value of investment V equals the agents mar-
ginal cost
V = C 0(; ) =) () (1)
which denes a strictly increasing rst best investment path ().
As in L&R, rst best incentives are unattainable within at standard con-
test. To see this, consider a contest with base wage W and prize premium
r, and assume to the contrary that rst best incentives are achievable. The
expected prize obtained by type j, conditioned on her opponent investing
2If abilities were common knowledge a set of handicaps adjusting for di¤erences in
incentive power due to the type distribution e¤ect can be derived. Optimal handicapping
has received a lot of attention in the literature. See for example the discussion in Che
and Gale (2003) on R&D contests, Szymanskis (2003) survey on sporting contests and
Tsoulouhas et al (2007) analysis of CEO contests. However, as pointed out by McLaughlin
(1988): "The real problem with tournaments with heterogeneous contestants arises if the
contestants types cannot be identied".
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according to the rst best rule (), can be expressed
W +
Z 

G(j   ())f()rd
Di¤erentiating with respect to j yields the incentive power of the scheme
Z 

g(j   ())f()rd (2)
which can be approximated as follows3
Z 

g(j   ())f()rd  f(j)r
Hence, with a xed prize premium r the incentive power of the contest
is increasing in type density f(j). To provide intuition for this specic
property, observe that with type heterogeneity agents compete locally in the
following sense: on the margin, the agents gross benet from a small increase
in her investment level is proportional to the density of types investing at
that specic level; that is, the density of opponents of exactly her own type.
Clearly, given her ability, she beats inferior types, as she loses to superior
3The approximation is exact as the spread of G() converges to zero.
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types. Thus, facing an opponent of unknown ability, she invests as if her
opponent were of her own type.
First best requires a marginal benet of investment equal to the marginal
social value V . Thus, unless  is uniformly distributed, the incentive power
of the standard contest uctuates with type density, incompatible with rst
best (1).
From the literature on price discrimination, it is well known that the
principal may extract more surplus by introducing a menu of contracts and
let participants self-select, which is referred to as second degree price dis-
crimination. Let me rst investigate whether this approach is feasible in the
present setting. First best incentives would require that each type chooses a
contract providing her with a prize premium r that is inversely proportional
to her own type density f(), that is
r() =
V
f()
(3)
This yields an inverse relationship between density f() and prize premium
r().
As known from the literature, this approach is appropriate if preferences
satisfy "single crossing". However, unless f() is monotone, which is not
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standard, (3) creates non-monotonicity in r() which complicates contest de-
sign. To see this, let us consider the contestantsincentives to reveal their
true ability in a setting where each of them individually and independently
choose prizes r and W from a prize menu. Assume initially that rst best
incentives are achievable, and denote by P() the equilibrium win proba-
bility of a contestant of type  who invests . Her expected utility can then
be written
U = W + P(
)r   C(; )
The marginal rate of substitution between base wage W and prize pre-
mium r reects her win-probability
dW
dr
jU =  P() (4)
Consider now two types, H > L, and assume f(H) > f(L). Then,
rst best incentives requires that the two contestants choose prize premia
rH = V=f(H) and rL = V=f(L) respectively, where rH < rL since f(H) >
f(L). Furthermore, in rst best equilibrium the high types win probability
PH exceeds the win probability of the low type, PL, since the high type has a
higher investment level, (H) > (L). The two typesrespective marginal
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rates of substitution are depicted in gure 1, where it follows from (4) that
the high types MRS crosses the low types MRS from above.
W
r
WH
WL
High
Low
E¢ ciency requires, ref (3), that type L prefers V=f(L) and that the
higher type H prefers the smaller prize premium V=f(H). Furthermore,
denote by WL the base wage in the L contract and WH the base wage in
the H contract. For type L to prefer the L contract, the base wage in the
H contract must not exceed WH as depicted in the gure. However, if L is
indi¤erent between the two contracts, type H strictly prefers the L contract,
since Hs indi¤erence curves are steeper than Ls. Accordingly, any contract
that induces the low ability contestant to choose the high prize premium
provides the high type with incentive to mimic the low type.
Hence, to satisfy single crossing, higher types must be provided with
higher prize premia, incompatible with (3). This restriction can be satised
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by a slight modication of the scheme. The modication is to let the prize
distribution be conditioned on all contestantsmenu choices. This idea is
illustrated in gure 2.
rH
rL
Preferred by H
Preferred by L
low W
high W
Figure 2
The two downward sloping paths, with corresponding base wages, illus-
trate two alternative contracts. The upper path is combined with a low base
wage, and the lower path associated with a high base wage. Each path gives
the realized prize premium, conditioned on opponents type  which is re-
vealed by the opponents choice of contract. Observe that the upper path
dominates the lower path in the following sense: the upper path, for any
given opponent type, yields a strictly higher prize premium than the lower
path. Thus, with proper specications of base wages, high types would prefer
the upper path, whereas low types would prefer the lower path.
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Consider now the incentive power of the scheme. Despite the described
dominance property, a low types incentives may in equilibrium be stronger
than a high types. As discussed above, on the margin, the single agent
is concerned about the density of types around her own type. Thus she
calculates the prize premium obtained conditioned on beating an opponent
of her own type. Since the two paths are downward sloping, type L can be
provided with stronger incentives than a high type H : In the gure this is
indicated by the ellipses.
To provide more intuition, sorting in this example requires that high
ability types (with a high win probability) obtain higher prize premia than
low ability types. This explains the dominance in paths. Consider now, as
an illustration, a standard single peak ability distribution: due to low density
of types in the low ability tail, in a standard contest low ability contestants
have weak incentive power. To restore e¢ ciency, their stake in the contest
must be strengthened - hence they must be provided with a larger prize
premium. Since their ability is low and it is likely that they will lose, they
are also provided with a high losing prize. To prevent high ability types from
mimicking low ability types, the contract designed for low ability types yields
a low prize premium if a contestant (who pretends to be of low ability) beats a
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more able opponent. The point is that a low ability type does not su¤er much
from a low prize premium conditioned on beating a more able contestant, as
it is unlikely that she actually will beat this superior opponent. A high
ability contestant however, is "punished" in the sense that, by mimicking
low types, she can only obtain a high prize premium by facing an opponent
who claims to be a low type - which again is highly unlikely. Observe that
the expected prize premium of the low type, conditional on winning, exceeds
its unconditional expectation, a kind of "reversed winners curse". Hence low
ability types are induced to "bid" aggressively.
The next section proves the existence of a contest design that provides
agents with rst best incentives in a setting with dual information asymmetry.
Let me rst add some comments regarding the literature. This paper is not
the rst to deal with this specic sorting problem in contests. As mentioned,
OKee¤e et al (1984), Bhattacharaya and Guasch (1988) and Yun (1997) all
address similar problems. However their models are formulated such that the
non-monotonicity problem described above is avoided. OKee¤e et al (1984)
consider a model of self-selection which divides contestants into separate
high and low ability leagues, where self-selection is achieved by increasing the
prize spread in the high-ability league (which prevents climbing of low ability
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contestants) and reducing the prize spread of the low ability league (which
prevents slumming of high ability contestants into the low ability league). To
restore e¤ort incentives in the low ability league, the degree of monitoring
precision in this league must increase (which increases the marginal return
from e¤ort).
Bhattacharaya and Guasch (1988) show that e¢ ciency is restored through
self-selection among wage contracts, where each contestant is compared with
the output of an agent with the lowest e¢ cient investment level. I comment
below on the motivation behind this specic ranking mechanism.
Yun (1997), addressing the rst part of the L&R ine¢ ciency result re-
garding self-selection into homogenous leagues, considers two-prize standard
contests with multiple agents, where the proportion of agents paid the low
prize is endogenously determined. He demonstrates that by varying what he
refers to as the "penalizing rule" - the proportion of low prizes in each contest
- he establishes a sorting device where each (discrete) type will self-sort into
her own league.
The sorting mechanism used in these contributions, basically that high
ability contestants have a stronger preference for high prize premia than
low ability contestants, cannot support full e¢ ciency. The reason is that
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the mechanism is compatible with rst best incentives only if the incen-
tive problem is one-sided in the sense that the optimal incentive power is
monotonically increasing in type. However, this assumption is not compati-
ble with standard ability distributions.
In Bhattacharaya and Guasch the non-monotonicity problem is avoided
by assuming that each contestant competes with a threshold represented by
the investment level of a hypothetical agent with the lowest possible ability
(consequently the density of the noise term is strictly decreasing, since each
contestants investment exceeds the threshold). However, competing against
a threshold requires that performance relative to the threshold is measurable,
which is more information demanding - thus their contribution is incompati-
ble with one of the appealing aspects of contests - that ordinal information is
su¢ cient. In OKee¤e et al and in Yun, the problem is avoided by introduc-
ing new elements (for instance by manipulating the noise term as in O-Kee¤e
et al).
The next section characterize formally the modied contest scheme in the
two-player case, and discusses briey generalizations to n players. The nal
section concludes.
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4 The generalized contest
The model is based on the following time structure: in stage one two con-
testants enter, and pay an entry fee to the principal. After entering, in stage
two, contestants learn their abilities. In stage three they simultaneously and
independently choose winning and losing prizes from a prize menu and in
stage four they compete in the contest.
The motivation behind the assumption that contestants learn their abili-
ties after entry (and after the entry fee is sunk), is to maintain rst best e¤ort
as the optimal benchmark, thus focusing on the design problem discussed in
L&R and subsequent literature. If contestants knew their abilities in ad-
vance, the standard trade o¤ between rent extraction and e¢ ciency arises.4
Since contestants are symmetric ex ante, the entry fee is determined such
that agents are on their respective participation constraints, and optimal
design corresponds to the rst best benchmark.
In the model it is convenient, as is common in the literature, to represent
self-selection by letting the contestants report their abilities. Formally the
reporting stage and the contest stage go as follows: rst contestants j and
4If contestants knew their types before sinking the entry cost, the problem corresponds
to the design of optimal contracts under asymmetric information. An equivalence result
demonstrating that ordinal comparison is su¢ cient for optimal contracts can be shown.
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k report their respective abilities bj;bk. As in L&R, contestants compete
in investment levels j; k. If j loses the contest she is paid the base wage
W (bj), and if she wins she receives the additional prize premium r(bj;bk),
which depends on her own announcement bj as well as on her opponents
report bk. Observe that r(bj;bk) may di¤er from r(bk;bj), the prize premium
k obtains in case she is deemed the winner. Finally, contestant j does not
observe k0s report, and vice versa.
Worker j0s utility as a function of her type j and report bj is
U(j;bj) = max

"
W2(bj) + Z 

G(  ())r(bj; )f()d   C(; j)# (5)
where (j) denotes the optimal investment for type j measured in a truth-
telling equilibrium. As the object function is strictly concave in , (j) is
continuous and strictly increasing in j.
Consider the sorting conditions. From the envelope theorem it follows
that
dU(j;bj)
dbj = W 02(bj) +
Z 

G((j)  ())r1(bj; )f()d = 0 (6)
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Di¤erentiating (6) with respect to type j yields
dU2(j;bj)
dbjdj =
Z 

g((j)  ())r1(bj; )f()dd(j)
dj
(7)
Sorting requires that (7) is positive; the marginal benet of a higher
announcement b is increasing in type . A su¢ cient (but not necessary)
condition for (7) to be positive for all b;  is that r1(bj; ) is positive for
all . If this holds the standard single crossing condition is satised, and a
separating contract exists.
Lemma 1 Consider prize premium functions r(b; ) > 0 dened on [; ] 
[; ] with r1(b; )  0 for all ;b. Then there exists a loser prize function
W (b) consistent with truth-telling.
First best e¢ ciency requires that
V = C 0(j; j)
and we refer to () as rst best investment which is strictly increasing in
.
From the rst order condition of the agents maximization problem we
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can derive the following: if there exists a prize premium r(j; ) satisfying
lemma 1 such that
Z 

g((j)  ())r(j; )f()d = C 0((j); j)  V all j (8)
then the generalized contest yields rst best incentives.
Due to lemma 1 it is su¢ cient to prove that there exists a set of proles
r(j; ) which induce each type j to invest at the e¢ cient level (j).The
main result, Proposition 1 below, states that rst best e¢ ciency is achievable
in a contest. The mechanism is to o¤er prize premia functions r(j; ) that
are i) increasing in own announcement j and ii) decreasing in the opponents
announcement .
The main result, which is proved in an appendix, can be stated:
Proposition 1 First best incentives are achievable in a generalized contest.
Proof. See appendix
The proposition characterizes prize premium functions providing rst best
incentives in a two-player contest. Generalizing the result to a multi-agent
setting is straightforward. As the probability of winning the contest in-
creases in ability, separation is feasible in a contest which remunerates the
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overall winner with a prize premium, and pays the remaining contestants
their respective loser prizes5. Let me provide a sketch of this procedure. De-
note by F() the probability that the highest competing type is , and by
G(j ( )()) the probability that the contestant beats all of her opponents
(with types drawn below  according to the type distribution F (:), truncated
at ). Then, the utility of contestant j can be expressed:
U(j;bj) = max
j
"
W2(bj) + Z 

G(j   ( )())r(bj; )dF()  C(j; j)
#
with the rst order condition (in a truth-telling equilibrium)
Z 

g((j)  ( )())r(j; )dF()d = C 0((j); j)
(where g denotes the density of G). The proof of proposition 2 can now be
replicated.
5Remunerating the overall winner is su¢ cient.
19
5 Concluding remarks
The paper demonstrates how a generalized contest can be designed to support
e¢ cient allocation under dual information asymmetry, where ability is private
information and output is observable with noise. High ability contestants
incentives are restored by providing them with a large upside, a high prize
premium and a low losers prize. Low ability contestants incentives are
restored by awarding them a high prize premium if winning conditioned on
being challenged by low ability opponents. The latter restriction ensures that
the contract is unattractive to high ability types.
This sorting problem is rather common and well known from the incentive
contract literature. For reference, consider the following classic information
problem within incentive contract design: in the design of incentive schemes
one often aims at enhancing the incentive power locally, for instance by pro-
viding the agent with a bonus for accomplishing a task or fullling a target.
Clearly, setting the target too low or too high yields poor incentives as the
bonus is either almost certain or unattainable. Hence, adjusting the tar-
get is a classic information problem when ability is private information. To
elaborate a bit further on this, consider the piecewise linear "kinked" incen-
tive scheme analyzed in Weitsman (1976), see also Holmström (1982), which
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goes as follows: initially the single agent is presented with a tentative reward
scheme consisting of a strictly increasing linear function of observed output.
Thereafter, the agent self-selects her nal reward scheme which is piecewise
linear with one kink. The essential point is that this nal reward function
is strictly below the tentative reward function everywhere except one single
point - the self selected kink. Clearly the agent is best o¤choosing a kink that
corresponds exactly with the output level which is optimal given her inherent
ability and given the initial tentative scheme. Thus, the sorting condition
is satised since the agent (relative to the tentative scheme) is punished by
choosing a low kink (that is by mimicking low types) as well as by choosing
a high kink (mimicking high types).
The self selected "kink" as sorting device corresponds logically to the
mechanism yielding self-sorting in the optimal contest derived in this paper,
where contestants choose from a menu of prizes. Since the principal only
has access to ordinal information, the reward can neither be conditioned on
observed output, nor on the bid (investment) itself. Yet the reward can be
conditioned on the opponentstypes, as this information is revealed through
their self selection of contest prizes. Mimicking inferior types is then avoided,
as we will see, by "punishing" agents for beating superior opponents.
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6 Appendix
Proof. Proposition 1
I rst prove the existence of a prize premium function supporting rst best
e¢ ciency given that the truth telling constraint is weakly satised. Hence
the prize premium depends only on the opponents announcement, r(j; ) =
rc(). Let h()  rc()f(): Then, e¢ ciency requires the existence of a
function h() such that
Z 

g((j)  ())h()d = V all j"[; ] (9)
To prove the existence of a function h() dene h1() and h0() such that
h1(i) = h0(i) + V   V0(i) (10)
where
V0(i) =
Z 

g((i)  ())h0()d
It follows that (10) is continuous and maps a closed, bounded and convex
function h() into itself. Hence a x point exists.
Secondly, to prove the existence of prize premia functions r(j; ) strictly
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increasing in the rst argument (hence the sorting constraint is strictly sat-
ised), and supporting e¢ ciency: consider an arbitrary type nj and assume
h() satises (9). Construct a new function hn() which is "tilted around"
h(nj ), that is h
n() h() > (<)0 if  < (>)nj , where jhn() h()j is strictly
increasing in j   nj j, and such that
Z 

g((nj )  ())hn()d = V
Observe that an increase in j moves the probability mass g((j)  ())
to the right, and since g(:) is unimodal and strictly increasing (decreasing)
below (above) zero, it follows that
Z 

g((j)  ())hn()d > V for all j < nj (11)
and Z 

g((j)  ())hn()d < V for all j > nj
Consider then an arbitrary type mj < 
n
j : Due to (11) we can establish the
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existence of a function hm() where hm() < hn() for all  and
Z 

g((mj )  ())hm()d = V (12)
As this holds for any pairs (nj ; 
m
j ) it follows that we can draw for each type
j a type specic prize premium denoted r(j; ) such that r(
m
j ; ) < r(
n
j ; )
whenever mj < 
n
j , hence strict truth-telling is established.
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